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The classic problem of free riding arises
when nations act to curtail emissions of carbon
dioxide (CO2) and other potential greenhouse
gases. When damages from emissions are global
rather than local, countries that do not partici-
pate in policies directed at reducing global 
climate change receive the benefits of other
countries’ actions without incurring the costs.
Past research and game-theoretic analyses
have emphasized the gains from eliciting the
cooperation of developing countries in an effort
to limit global CO2 emissions (Bohm 1993;
Brown and Huntington 1994b; Eyckmans,
Proost, and Schokkaert 1993; Hoel 1991b and
1994; Manne and Rutherford 1994; and Welsch
1995). Broader participation reduces the costs 
of achieving any given target of emissions
reductions among those nations engaged in the
coordinated policies. In essence, the cost curve
for countries reducing their emissions shifts
downward as participation expands to include
more countries.
Recent estimates of possible climate-
change damages allow us to examine the im-
pact of cooperation on the optimal strategy for
reducing CO2 emissions. Because increased 
participation lowers the costs of coordinated
policies to reduce emissions, it is likely to in-
crease the amount of conservation that the par-
ticipants would see as cost effective for any
given set of estimates of the benefits of reducing
emissions and avoiding environmental damage.
Whether increased cooperation yields too little
or too great a reduction in emissions from a
world perspective depends critically upon the
level of damage estimates—an empirical issue
that at the moment is highly uncertain.
Reduced usage of fossil fuels, through
higher efficiency equipment and changing eco-
nomic structures and lifestyles, is the principal
vehicle for CO2 emissions abatement. Policies
that discourage the use of coal, oil, and, to a
lesser extent, natural gas contribute to reduced
emissions of greenhouse gases and hence lower
the potential damages from climate change.
Analysis of abatement policies affecting the oil
market can seem complex, because actions
taken by one country or group of countries are
likely to influence oil consumption in other
parts of the world through their effect on the
world oil price.
In this article, we evaluate the extent to
which increasing cooperation beyond the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to limit CO2 emissions
through oil conservation is desirable from a






Stephen P. A. Brown
Senior Economist and Assistant Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Hillard G. Huntington
Executive Director
Energy Modeling Forum, Stanford University
In this article, we evaluate 




(OECD) to limit CO2 emissions
through oil conservation 
is desirable from a 
world perspective.FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS       3 ECONOMIC REVIEW  SECOND QUARTER 1998
derive cost and benefit curves from recent 
studies of world oil markets and the nascent 
literature on the damages arising from changes
in the world climate. Our analysis shows that
the desirability of extending cooperation in
global energy conservation policies is essentially
an empirical issue rather than a conceptual 
one. In addition, the current evidence suggests
that over the next two decades, the OECD will
have an incentive to reduce its oil consump-
tion by more than is optimal from a world 
perspective—even when its actions are evalu-
ated on a precautionary approach to reducing
CO2 emissions.
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ESTIMATING THE COST OF OIL CONSERVATION
As in several previous studies, we use a
welfare-theoretic framework built on top of a
simulation model of the world oil market to
compute cost curves for oil conservation under
alternative assumptions about which countries
are participating in the policy. The curves in-
dicate how participants’ costs change as the
level of conservation increases. The cost curves
include the direct resource costs associated 
with shifting inputs from other sectors into
energy conservation activities, the wealth trans-
fers associated with changes in the oil price, and
the effects of increased oil consumption in non-
participating countries.
The World Oil Market
Our analysis divides the world into four
regions: the industrialized OECD countries;
China, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union (C/EE/FSU); OPEC members; and other
less developed countries (other LDCs). The sim-
ulation model is calibrated to reproduce the oil
price, production, and consumption data shown
in Table 1. The data in the table represent one
of many possible oil-market outlooks for the
year 2010. It is based on the midprice case in
the U.S. Energy Information Administration’s
(EIA)  1993 International Energy Outlook.
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The projected oil demand conditions
depend on a variety of assumptions about eco-
nomic growth, prices of competing fuels, and
the extent of oil-saving technological change in
the absence of price changes. The supply con-
ditions outside of OPEC member countries incor-
porate assumptions about the resource base,
engineering constraints on developing resources,
and producer-country taxes and policies. In
these projections, OPEC members satisfy the
excess demand, but adjust the next period’s
price in response to market tightness.
Table 1 also summarizes representative
estimates of the long-run supply and demand
responses to price for the major regional areas
in the analysis. They represent mean estimates
derived from an Energy Modeling Forum study
(1991), which compared ten major world oil
market models, and are similar to those used by
the EIA in developing the projections shown in
the first column. The estimates in the table were
used in construction of the simulation model.
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The responses for the C/EE/FSU region
are judgmental. Their production and consump-
tion decisions are likely to be influenced greatly
by the forces of economic transition, resulting 
in smaller responses to changes in world oil
prices than found in other regions. In fact, if the
supply and demand responses for the C/EE/FSU
were made comparable to responses for other
country groups, the conservation scenarios con-
sidered here would push world oil prices suf-
ficiently low that we would estimate these
economies would import significant quantities
of oil. We consider this result untenable and
therefore assume a smaller response to price
than for other countries. To the extent that these
countries yield a greater response to price, the
estimated costs of achieving various world con-
servation targets without cooperation from these
countries would be larger than reported here.
The response of oil producers within
OPEC is highly uncertain. To date, formal mod-
eling of OPEC decisions has been far from reli-
able. OPEC appears to operate like an imperfect
cartel during some periods but not during 
others.
4 The OPEC countries appear to be about
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Other LDCs 12.2 .40
Discrepancyd .3 n.a.
Total 85.9
a Midprice case from EIA’s 1993 International Energy Outlook. Price is $29.30 per barrel (1991$).
b Percent change in quantity for each 1 percent change in price.Based on Energy Modeling Forum
(1991), except for C/EE/FSU, which is based on the authors’ judgment.
c China, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union.
d Includes net stock withdrawals.
* OPEC responds to hold a constant market share. See text.4
as uncomfortable with a rapidly increasing mar-
ket share (as accompanied the relatively low
prices in the 1960s) as they are with a rapidly
decreasing market share (as occurred in the
aftermath of the price hikes of the late 1970s
and early 1980s). The analysis presented here
assumes that OPEC acts to maintain a constant
market share.
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The Cost of Conservation
We examine conservation policies by
reducing oil consumption in participating coun-
tries below the levels shown in Table 1 and
allowing the world oil price to adjust to restore
a balance between oil supply and demand con-
ditions. Analytically, we use a tax to reduce oil
consumption in the participating groups of coun-
tries. The tax approach assumes that conserva-
tion measures are applied across all end uses.
As shown in Figure 1, an oil conservation
tax applied in the OECD acts to depress the
world oil price while it boosts the oil price faced
by consumers in the OECD. A reduced world oil
price has two important effects. It yields trans-
fers from oil exporting countries to oil import-
ing countries that operate to offset some of the
costs that OECD incurs by imposing conserva-
tion policies. It also stimulates oil consumption
in countries not participating in the conserva-
tion efforts.
Using values from the simulations, we con-
struct cost curves using Equation B.4 from the
box titled “Some Analytics of Oil Conservation.”
This methodology follows a welfare-theoretic
approach previously employed by Brown and
Huntington (1994a) and Felder and Rutherford
(1993). The resulting cost curves take into
account the direct welfare costs of a country’s
conservation efforts, transfers of wealth from oil
exporting to oil importing countries, and the
effect that lower world oil prices will have in
stimulating oil consumption in nonparticipating
countries. The cost curves also take into account
the economic cost of OPEC cartelization.
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Construction of the cost curves depends
critically on the assumptions used. In particular,
assumptions that world oil production or OECD
oil consumption is more responsive to price
would tend to work against the conclusions pre-
sented below. Nonetheless, sensitivity analysis
using a range of plausible assumptions about
the outlook for 2010 and the responsiveness of
consumption and production to changes in
price yielded overall conclusions similar to
those reported below.
To maintain the emphasis on the sub-
stantial difference in market response to the
inclusion of additional countries, our analysis
abstracts from a number of important consider-
ations that would be incorporated in a more
refined analysis. These considerations include
alternative policies for distributing conservation
goals across countries (Whalley and Wigle 1991,
and Brown and Huntington 1994b); the design
of taxes and redistributive mechanisms (Hoel
1991b); and an explicit accounting for different
types of goods (Felder and Rutherford 1993,
and Pezzey 1992). We also abstract from the
effects of preexisting energy taxes and other
taxes. Preexisting taxes could be reduced to 
offset some of the costs of a new conservation
policy (Hoel 1991b) or be left in place, which
would affect the estimated costs of imposing a
new conservation policy (Newberry 1992).
Similarly, for some LDCs, removing subsi-
dies to the energy sector could reduce energy
use and improve economic efficiency, which
contrasts to our assumption that conservation is
achieved through taxes that impose costs on the
economy. Alternatively, some LDCs may have
supply-constrained energy consumption, and
the costs of their conservation efforts would be
higher than we estimate here.
DIFFERING INCENTIVES FOR OIL CONSERVATION
In Figure 2, the cost curve labeled “World”
shows how much each additional barrel of
world oil conservation costs all nations collec-
tively. The construction of this curve assumes
that conservation is first adopted wherever it is
cheapest. The curve incorporates the efficiency
losses resulting from the OPEC cartel restricting
output below free market levels, as well as the
direct costs associated with shifting resources
Figure 1
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toward oil conservation. The world curve does
not incorporate any transfers, because any trans-
fers the oil-importing nations obtain through 
the lower oil prices induced by conservation 
are exactly offset by transfers away from oil 
producers. The curve starts above zero to incor-
porate the economic efficiency losses associated
with OPEC restricting its output.
The cost curve labeled “OECD” shows
how much each additional barrel of world con-
servation costs the OECD countries if only they
act to conserve oil. As such, this curve is con-
structed to reflect the increase in non-OECD
consumption that will result from lower world
oil prices induced by unilateral OECD action to
conserve oil. At lower levels of oil conservation,
the cost to OECD is negative because lower
prices fostered by its conservation efforts trans-
fer wealth from oil exporting nations to the
OECD. At about 5 million barrels per day of
world oil conservation, the marginal cost
reaches zero and is positive thereafter.
Although the OECD cost curve lies below
the world cost curve at lower levels of conser-
vation, it rises more sharply with conservation
for two reasons. The wealth transfer to the
Some Analytics of Oil Conservation
We use a welfare-theoretic approach to derive formulas for the marginal cost of oil conservation. For
any country (or country grouping), social welfare in the oil market is the sum of its consumer and producer
surpluses:
In the above equation, Wi denotes the welfare country i obtains from the oil market, QDi the quantity of oil
demanded in country i, PDi country i ’s demand price (the market’s marginal valuation of consumption
excluding externalities) at each quantity (Q), PW the world price of oil, QSi the quantity of oil production in
country i, and PSi country i ’s oil supply price (marginal cost of its oil production excluding externalities) at
each quantity (Q).
THE COST OF GROSS CONSERVATION
If the marginal cost of conservation is defined as the welfare lost in country i ’s oil market by reducing
its oil consumption on the margin, the negative of the first derivative of W with respect to QD yields the
marginal cost of conservation:
In the above equation, MCi denotes the marginal cost of conservation, QCi the quantity of conservation
(where ¶QCi = –¶QDi), and QMi the quantity of net oil imports for country i. As Equation B.2 shows, the
gross marginal cost of oil conservation is the difference between the domestic and world prices of oil 
(PDi – PW) minus the transfer obtained by reducing the price of imported oil (¶PW/¶QCi is negative).
THE COST OF NET CONSERVATION
The net effect of conservation actions taken by a country or group of countries is the quantity of its
conservation minus the induced change in oil consumption in the rest of the world.The change in oil con-
sumption in nonparticipating countries depends on how their consumption is affected by a change in the
world oil price and how the conservation actions in the participating countries affect the world oil price.
Therefore, the relationship between a change in participant conservation and the net change in world oil
conservation can be expressed as
In the above equation, QCW denotes world oil conservation and QDX the quantity of oil consumption by non-
participating countries.
Following Felder and Rutherford (1993) and Brown and Huntington (1994a), Equations B.2 and B.3
can be combined to express the marginal cost of net world oil conservation for country (or country group-
ing) i. Specifically, multiplying the marginal cost of the gross conservation in country i by the net change in
world conservation resulting from country i ’s conservation yields
In the above equation, MCWi denotes the marginal cost net world oil conservation to country i.
As Equation B.4 shows, the effects that cooperative oil conservation has on the cost of oil imports 
and on nonparticipant oil consumption are related through the world oil price. As cooperative conservation
lowers the world oil price, it reduces the cost of country i ’s oil imports and brings about an increase in non-
participant oil consumption. If conservation has no effect on the world oil price, however, both the cost of oil
imports and nonparticipant oil consumption will remain unchanged.
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OECD becomes smaller as greater conservation
reduces imports. In addition, the direct costs
increase more sharply for the OECD curve than
for the world curve because conservation pro-
jects can be selected from only OECD countries
rather than worldwide. As a consequence, for
conservation levels of about 8 million barrels
per day and higher, the OECD cost curve lies
above the world cost curve.
The OECD and world cost curves illustrate
that the oil-importing OECD countries, acting as
a group, have an incentive to select a level of
oil conservation that is not optimal from a world
perspective. Whether unilateral OECD action
that is unmatched by other countries leads to
too much or too little emissions reduction, how-
ever, cannot be determined by the cost infor-
mation alone. This issue can be resolved only
by knowing the estimated benefits of (or dam-
ages avoided by) oil conservation.
Previous analysis suggests a flat marginal
damage curve. Summarizing the previous litera-
ture, Peck and Teisberg (1992) explain that
marginal damage costs are essentially unaf-
fected by the emissions levels in any given
decade. This conclusion rests on the finding that
temperature change depends upon gas concen-
tration, which is not greatly affected by the
emissions levels in any given decade. We adopt
this characterization by assuming horizontal
damage curves that depict a constant level of
benefits for any level of oil conservation.
Figure 2 also illustrates the situation for
two hypothetical marginal benefit curves—one
at $15 per barrel and one at $30 per barrel.
When the marginal benefits of oil conservation
are below about $24 per barrel, the OECD has
an incentive to pursue more conservation than
is optimal from the world perspective, as is illus-
trated along the $15 marginal benefit curve. In
this range, the $15 curve intersects the OECD
marginal cost curve to the right of its inter-
section with the world marginal cost curve.
Unilateral OECD action could result in too much
oil conservation from a world perspective.
Moreover, at benefit levels below about
$24 per barrel, cooperation from the group of
oil-importing countries previously identified as
“other LDCs” will exacerbate the discrepancy
between what is optimal from a world perspec-
tive and what participants would have the
incentive to choose. As shown in Figure 3,
cooperation between the OECD and the other
LDCs shifts the participant’s cost curve for world
oil conservation from the one labeled “OECD”
to the one labeled “OECD + other LDCs.”
7 At
benefit levels below about $24 per barrel, the
equilibrium amount of oil conservation selected
by the participating countries will be even
greater—producing even more abatement of
CO2 emissions than would be optimal from a
world perspective.
When the benefits are above about $24
per barrel, the OECD has an incentive to pursue
less oil conservation than is optimal from a
world perspective, as is illustrated along the $30
benefit curve. Under these conditions, the mar-
ginal benefit line intersects the OECD’s marginal
cost curve to the left of its intersection with the
world’s marginal cost curve. Unilateral OECD
action could result in too little oil conservation.
Some limited cooperation from developing
countries could help ameliorate this problem by
shifting the cost curve outward, but full cooper-
ation from all developing countries would shift
the curve far to the right, and the participants
Figure 2
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would seek more conservation than would be
optimal from a world perspective unless the
benefits of oil conservation were more than
about $37 per barrel.
THE BENEFITS OF REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS
Damage estimates for CO2 are in their in-
fancy. Economic evaluations attempt to mone-
tize both market and nonmarket impacts of
greenhouse gas concentrations, and the result-
ing estimates vary considerably. Key uncertain-
ties include the dynamics of the carbon cycle
governing the effect of emissions on concen-
trations, the effect of concentrations on tem-
perature change, and the consequences of
temperature change on market and nonmarket
damages. Differences in discount rates for eval-
uating potential impacts over horizons of 100
years or more account for a significant part of
the differences in damage estimates. Finally,
estimates vary depending upon the decade for
which they are computed; estimated damages
increase for later decades.
Table 2 reports estimates from several
prominent studies providing monetized esti-
mates of the marginal damages arising from 
CO2 emissions in the decade 2001–10. Re-
searchers usually report their estimates in U.S.
dollars per ton carbon (tC), as shown in the 
first column. We convert these estimates to U.S.
dollars per barrel of oil in the second column.
In oil-equivalent terms, the mean damage esti-
mates range from about $1 to $3 per barrel
across different studies. Emphasizing the dra-
matic uncertainty in these estimates, the Fank-
hauser study (1994) provides a range from less
than $1 per barrel to almost $6.50 per barrel,
depending upon key parameter assumptions.
Hope and Maul (1996) use two economic-
environmental assessment models—Intera and
PAGE—to provide similar estimates to the
range shown by Fankhauser without specifying
the decade for their analysis. Using the PAGE
model and what they identify as “the inner
uncertainty range” of the Intera model, they find
that damages from marginal CO2 emissions
range from $12 to $45 tC for the PAGE model
and from $3 to $50 tC for the Intera model. The
outer uncertainty range found with the Intera
model—which should be accorded a very low
probability because it combines many events,
each of which is accorded only a 5 percent
probability by experts—is $0 to $270 tC. Hope
and Maul suggest that policymakers who take
the threat of global warming seriously should
use a precautionary principle and penalize sources
of CO2 with the high estimates found with the
PAGE model or the inner uncertainty range of
the Intera model, which would amount to $5.63
(PAGE) or $6.50 (Intera) per barrel of oil.
Even for those taking a precautionary
approach to reducing CO2 emissions, the avail-
able damage estimates fall well below $24 per
barrel of oil. Combined with the cost curves of
oil conservation presented above, these damage
estimates suggest that unilateral action by the
OECD will lead to excessive oil conservation
and that adding oil-importing LDCs would exac-
erbate the problem.
8 At $0 to $33.75 per barrel,
the outer uncertainty range found with the
Intera model emphasizes the possibility (but
low probability) of higher damage estimates
and thus indicates the need for further study of
the benefits of reducing CO2 emissions.
CONCLUSION: THE COSTS OF 
EXTENDING COOPERATION
The preliminary evidence suggests that
during the next two decades, OECD action to
conserve oil to reduce CO2 emissions is likely to
result in more oil conservation than is optimal
from a world perspective. For the OECD, coop-
erative oil conservation would reduce world oil
prices and yield wealth transfers from oil-
exporting countries to the oil-importing coun-
tries undertaking oil conservation policies.
These wealth transfers are sizable and positive
for the OECD nations, which collectively are
heavily dependent upon oil imports. For rela-
tively small oil-conservation strategies, as are
suggested by the nascent literature on the 
damages from CO2 emissions, these wealth
transfers will dominate the direct costs of con-
servation and lead to excessive conservation
from a world perspective. This result contrasts
sharply with the standard perspective that uni-
lateral OECD action is likely to lead to insuffi-
cient oil conservation.
Table 2
Estimated Damages from CO2 Emissions for 2001–10
Study $/tC* $/bbl†
Nordhaus (1991a,b) 7.3 .89
Nordhaus (1992) 6.8 .85
Peck and Teisberg (1993a,b) 12–14 1.46–1.71
Fankhauser (1994)
Mean 22.8 2.78
5th percentile 7.4 .90
95th percentile 52.9 6.45
* Adapted from Fankhauser (1994).
† Authors’ estimates based upon a conversion factor of $8/tC equals $1/bbl.Cambridge. Preliminary versions of this research were
presented at the Texas A&M Colloquium on Energy
Use and Sustainable Economic Growth and the annual
meeting of the U.S. Association for Energy Economics.
The authors would like to thank Irma Gomez, Chris
Hope, Paul Leiby, John Weyant, and Mine K. Yücel 
for helpful comments, without implicating them in the
conclusions.
1 The current analysis is limited to oil conservation and
does not consider interfuel substitution. Substantial
interfuel substitution could alter the analysis.
2 Although the EIA’s 1993 outlook is dated, particularly
in the $29.30 per barrel price forecasted for 2010, sen-
sitivity analysis using a range of plausible assumptions
about the outlook for 2010 yielded overall conclusions
similar to the results reported below.
3 The estimates are taken from Huntington (1992, 1993).
4 Griffin (1985) and Dahl and Yücel (1991) provide
empirical estimates of OPEC behavior that are broadly
consistent with this view.
5 A sensitivity analysis using alternative assumptions
that allow modest adjustments in OPEC’s market 
share confirm our general findings. In the extreme,
OPEC could maintain a given price and accept a 
substantial loss in market share in the face of reduced
demand. Under these conditions, the OECD would 
not obtain wealth gains from lower oil prices with
which to offset the direct costs of unilateral oil con-
servation policies.
6 To obtain the full cost of world conservation to the
world in the presence of OPEC cartelization, we add
marginal loss in producer surplus that results from
OPEC restricting its output. That is the share of world
oil coming from OPEC multiplied by the difference
between the world price of oil and OPEC’s full produc-
tion costs including user costs.
7 The cost curve is constructed to reflect the gains in
nonparticipant oil consumption that will result from
lower world oil prices induced by the cooperative
action to conserve oil. As such, it reflects participant
costs of world oil conservation.
8 Sensitivity testing, through the use of parameters to
replicate the behavior of several of the prominent
energy models that participated in a recent Energy
Modeling Forum study (1991), yielded qualitatively
similar results.
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